Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 50
Issue 1 Fall 2018

Article 4

2018

Introduction to Essays from “The Question of Religious Freedom:
From John Courtney Murray, SJ and Vatican II to the Present”
Michael H. Diaz
Barry Sullivan

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj

Recommended Citation
Michael H. Diaz, & Barry Sullivan, Introduction to Essays from “The Question of Religious Freedom: From
John Courtney Murray, SJ and Vatican II to the Present”, 50 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. ().
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol50/iss1/4

This Prefatory Matter is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more
information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Introduction to Essays from “The Question of
Religious Freedom: From John Courtney Murray, SJ
and Vatican II to the Present”
The papers that follow were originally presented at a conference
entitled “The Question of Religious Freedom: From John Courtney
Murray, SJ and Vatican II to the Present,” which was held at Loyola
University Chicago during Spring Semester 2018. Ambassador Miguel
H. Díaz, the John Courtney Murray University Chair in Public Service at
Loyola University Chicago, organized the conference, which gathered
together several prominent contributors to the contemporary conversation
about religious freedom from the worlds of law and religious studies.
Professor Hille Haker, the Richard A. McCormick, SJ, Chair in Catholic
Moral Theology, and the Department of Theology graciously agreed to
join him as cosponsors of the conference.
In recent times, religious freedom has reemerged as a key issue within
the United States and around the world. This development has occurred
in the context of now long-running culture wars, which recently have
taken on new political salience. The reemergence of religious freedom as
a key issue has been contentious and controversial, especially insofar as
religious freedom has been seen to stand in competition with other
fundamental human rights, and supporters of religious freedom have
sometimes been perceived to rely on the principle of religious freedom as
a sword rather than a shield. In the spirit of engaging these difficult
questions with a view towards advancing the common good, the papers
collected in this issue of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
address the subject of religious freedom as it relates to issues of social
polarization, peaceful coexistence, nondiscrimination, and the other
components of the common good.
Offering an introduction to these papers, Professor Miguel H. Díaz’s
paper An Unfinished Project: John Courtney Murray, Religious
Freedom, and Unresolved Tensions in Contemporary American Society,
addresses the contribution that John Courtney Murray, SJ made to
Dignitatis Humanae, the groundbreaking document on religious freedom
that the Second Vatican Council issued in 1965. Murray, as is well
known, was a leading Jesuit and public theologian who bridged
contemporary Catholic faith with American democracy. Professor Díaz
discusses Murray’s reasoned historical approach to what he termed the
American consensus, highlights the place that individual conscience
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occupies in Murray’s thought, and concludes with some observations on
currently unresolved questions relating to religious freedom in the United
States. Professor Díaz highlights “the unfinished nature of [Murray’s]
project and the need to revisit the complexity of this fundamental
constitutional right.” He argues that in light of recent developments
related to what Latin American theologians have termed the irruption of
the poor into history, any effort to advance religious freedom and achieve
an American consensus in the service of public order must be done
mindful of the option for and the rights of marginalized persons and
communities. Such an emphasis, Professor Díaz suggests, can deepen
Roman Catholic commitment to the advancement of religious freedom
consistent with the evolution that Murray brought about, taking the
Church from the position that “error has no rights” to one that affirms that
“only people—not ideas—have rights.”
Two questions frame Professor Robin W. Lovin’s paper Religious
Freedom and Public Argument: John Courtney Murray on “The
American Proposition”: Is it good? Is it politics? Building upon Murray’s
argument that any American consensus fails as a matter of fact, but has
the chance to succeed as a matter of “need,” Professor Lovin emphasizes
the Augustinian idea that “all goods are ordered in relation to one another
by the relation that all of them have to God, and the idea that over a
lifetime of experience, people can develop a reasonable apprehension of
what that order is.” Professor Lovin, however, readily admits that the
question of what is good is not sufficient to address the current polarizing
conversations surrounding the protection of religious freedom. Public
consensus and issues of politics and public policy must be equally
addressed. On the one hand, Professor Lovin argues that, “Religious
activists sometimes seem to avoid questions about the details of policy
by grounding their claims in biblical images and language, so that it
becomes more and more difficult to distinguish their political program
from an altar call.” On the other hand, Professor Lovin cautions: “In place
of a theology that is overly political, we now have a politics that is quasitheological. Party programs have taken on a kind of ideological rigidity
that makes them invulnerable to criticism or refinement.”
In Prophesy, Public Theology, and Questions of Justice: Some Modest
Reflections, Professor Barry Sullivan argues that while Murray was
undoubtedly an important contributor to the work of Vatican II and the
development of American public theology, his contribution may at times
be overstated, partly because the contributions of other important voices
are minimized and partly because some erroneously view Catholicism in
overly monolithic terms, thereby overlooking the rich historical diversity
of Catholic thought concerning political freedom and democracy.
Professor Sullivan also questions the lacuna that exists in Murray’s
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thought with respect to some of the most salient features of public life in
the United States, especially the then-growing awareness of the
immorality of racism and its fundamental inconsistency with principles
of liberal democracy. Critiquing Murray’s seminal work, We Hold These
Truths: Catholic Reflections of the American Proposition, Professor
Sullivan argues that, “racism continued to be a central feature of ‘the
American proposition.’ For that reason, it is difficult today to read
Murray’s work without being struck by the virtual absence of any
discussion of racial segregation, racial prejudice, or the practical
exclusion of African Americans from meaningful participation in the
political life of the country.” Given this seemingly inexplicable omission,
Professor Sullivan suggests that we need to be mindful of the possibility
that “public theology may have more in common with politics than with
prophesy.” His paper invites a more inclusive reading of social injustice
to sharpen moral judgments for the sake of fostering necessary and just
legal change.
In Religious Freedom, Human Rights, and Peaceful Coexistence,
Professor Leslie Griffin emphasizes the magnitude of John Courtney
Murray’s ecclesial achievement, namely, moving the Catholic Church
from its core belief that that “the separation of church and state is clearly
wrong, an evil to be tolerated and changed whenever it can be,” to an
understanding of the relationship of church and state that is centered on
“the freedom of the church, not the establishment of the church.” Central
to Murray’s position was a recognition—subsequently endorsed by the
Second Vatican Council—that “the right to religious freedom belongs to
every human individual, not just to the individual church or just to
Catholics.” Professor Griffin also points out, however, that “many of
Murray’s successors, both Catholic and non-Catholic, in courts,
legislatures, and voting booths, have instead remained overwhelmingly
committed to their own religious truth instead of to everyone’s religious
rights.” The upshot of these developments, Professor Griffin argues, is
that “the state’s actors have empowered church institutions while
neglecting individuals”—a hypothesis that she tests by reviewing the law
relevant to employment discrimination, access to contraceptives, and
same-sex marriage. In each of these areas, religious leaders have
aggressively taken positions that value the church’s religious freedom
over that of the individual. According to Professor Griffin, “[t]he law
protects women’s rights, reproductive rights, and gay and lesbian rights.
It should be up to individuals, not their church’s hierarchy, to decide
whether to exercise those rights.”
In The Right to Religious Freedom—A Theological Comment,
Professor Hille Haker explains the return of religion into the public
sphere, attends to the historical context of religious freedom debates, and
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addresses the contemporary politicization of religion. Exploring the
complexity that defending the right to religious freedom entails, Professor
Haker cautions that what “counts as a human rights violation is not
always easy to discern.” In addressing difficult and often polarizing
questions in society, such as that of religious freedom, she invites us “to
listen to all sides” and be willing “to come up with prudent practical
solutions.” Professor Haker’s paper underscores that human dignity is
“not a metaphysical concept that relates to a metaphysical order but a
moral concept that relates to our situated vulnerable agency.” “One of the
greatest insights of . . . the concept of dignity,” she points out, “is that
God-given freedom is reflected in the conscience of the moral agent;
conscience, not the authority of the Church, is the ultimate reference that
a person must abide by.” Faithfulness to this tradition entails “[c]reating
a space for everyone in the public sphere, and claiming the rights for those
who have no rights entails the duty to speak out for the rights of
others . . . . This ‘preferential option’ for the rights of others . . . in reality
is a responsibility.”
In Religious Freedom and the Common Good, Professor Kathleen
Brady notes that, in the context of ongoing culture wars, “few topics are
more important to consider than the relationship between religious
freedom and the common good.” In Professor Brady’s view, too little
attention has been given to that important relationship. “In some cases,
the problem has been a narrow focus on one’s own interests and neglect
of competing considerations. More often, though, the problem has been
partial understandings of what is, in fact, a complex and nuanced
relationship.” For Professor Brady, “pursuing religious freedom with the
common good in mind” means that believers must not focus only on
protecting their own rights, but “must also consider the effects of their
demands on others and the larger community.” By the same token, “those
impacted by the protections religious believers seek must also consider
the value of religious liberty.” For religious liberty to be pursued in light
of the common good, Professor Brady argues, “[e]ach side must carefully
consider what it really needs and not insist upon advantages that are not
really necessary,” with each side being “willing to address what is most
important to the other.” Professor Brady believes that “constitutional
rules regarding the requirements and limits of religious accommodation
should foster such compromises.” She also believes that the
“considerable power” that religious conservatives wield in the Trump
Administration provides an opportunity for religious leaders who “have
followed the same well-worn paths focused on protecting their own
rights” to refocus their efforts on the common good, “reaching out to
others of good will to try to overcome some of our society’s deepest
divisions.”
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In From Common Good to Convivencia: Religious Liberty and the
Cake Wars, Professor Carmen Nanko-Fernández examines the central
relationship between theological and legal constructs related to religious
freedom and inaccurate interpretations of religious texts and theological
traditions that bear on legal arguments. Professor Nanko-Fernández’s
paper emphasizes that, “Theological discrepancies and biblical
interpretations are not the concern of the courts, as the Supreme Court
articulated in 1871 in Watson v. Jones.” On the other hand, she notes that,
“Attention to the theological details is necessary . . . on the part of our
churches and religious entities who participate in these cases by filing
amicus briefs and/or by adding to the rhetoric around highly charged
neuralgic and contested issues like same-sex marriage.” Professor
Nanko-Fernández’s paper invites a more just, comprehensive, and
accurate consideration of religious freedom and religious traditions, one
that avoids dichotomous treatments of sacred and secular subjects (e.g.
LGBT persons as secular versus those who do not accept same-sex
marriage as religious). In so doing, she questions whether we might be
using the courts “to engage in ecumenical and interreligious debates that
belong in another sector of the public square.”
Finally, taking Section 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights as his
fundamental text, Professor Thomas Berg argues in his essay, Religious
Freedom and Nondiscrimination, that “nondiscrimination is a crucial
component of religious freedom,” but that “religious freedom is also a
value independent of nondiscrimination, and the two sometimes come in
conflict.” Professor Berg begins by discussing the nondiscrimination
principle. Among other things, Berg discusses the Supreme Court’s
willingness to inquire into the motivation of the Colorado Human Rights
Commission in determining that the baker was the object of antireligious
animus, while refusing to look into President Trump’s antireligious
motivation in Trump v. Hawaii. He argues that, “[i]t is unfair to accuse
the Court’s majority [in Trump] of rank hypocrisy,” but “the Trump
majority certainly failed in an important opportunity to give teeth to the
basic constitutional principle against official religious bigotry.” “To
preserve religious freedom as a principle, not a tool, we must enforce it
for all,” Professor Berg argues. He then emphasizes that
nondiscrimination does not exhaust the concept of religious freedom:
“Equality is little comfort without a baseline guarantee of actual freedom;
equality alone could mean equal suppression of all religions.” Noting the
tension between these two values, Professor Berg then suggests an
approach aimed at protecting both sides. Applying that model to the facts
of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Professor Berg concludes that the baker must
win because “[t]he harm of regulation on the religious side is permanent
loss of identity or permanent loss of occupation,” which is “far greater
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than the one-time dignitary harm on the couple’s side.”
As all these papers make clear, the need for reasoned conversation in
the area of religious freedom has never been greater. The authors’
arguments, we hope, may promote greater clarity and literacy with
respect to both legal and religious matters that affect the protection of
religious freedom as a fundamental human right. Through ongoing
conversation with diverse stakeholders, we hope that public consensus
may emerge—a new American consensus, if you will—that responds to
“the signs of the times” and addresses the need for just and well-informed
legal decisions, carefully weighing the right of religious freedom with the
concerns of particular persons, institutions, and the voices of those who
defend equally fundamental human rights within our democratic society.
Miguel H. Díaz, John Courtney Murray University Chair in Public
Service
Barry Sullivan, Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy
Loyola University Chicago

